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"NONCOERCIVE" SUPPORT FOR RELIGION:
ANOTHER FALSE CLAIM ABOUT THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*

One of the fundamental and recurring controversies about the meaning of
the First Amendment's religion clauses is whether government must be neutral
between religion and nonreligion. The Supreme Court has always said yes in
modem times, but persistent critics have always said no.
The Court's critics have offered two major alternatives to neutrality. The

older alternative is nonpreferentialism:

that government may aid religion so

long as it does not prefer one religion over another.' The more recently
proposed alternative is noncoercion: that government may aid or endorse all
religions or particular religions so long as it does not coerce anyone to religious
practice or belief. The fullest development of the noncoercion theory is in the
briefs in Lee v. Weisman.2 Michael McConnell proposed an academic version
of the theory, arguing that coercion must at least be an element of any
McConnell's position was always more
Establishment Clause analysis. 3
sensitive to the needs of religious minorities than the position in the Lee briefs,
and in a more recent work, he has further moderated his position.4 Justice
Kennedy has proposed a theory in which noncoercion is a prominent element,
but he also adds a requirement that government refrain from proselytizing.'

Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas at Austin, and
Associate Dean for Research in the School of Law. This article discusses Lee v. Weisman, a case
in which I wrote an amicus curiae brief on behalf of several religious organizations and one secular
civil liberties organization.
1. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 105-06 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION

(1982).
2. See Brief for the Petitioners; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, in the Supreme Court of the United States (No. 90-1014).
3. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Los Element of Esmablshment, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 933 (1986).
4. Michael W. McConnell, Religlous Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1991).
5. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In earlier work, I have explored the possible meanings of neutrality,'
argued against nonpreferentialism, 7 and sketched the beginnings of an argument
against the noncoercion theory. 8 In this article, I wish to clarify the relationship
among the three theories, and then further develop the argument for neutrality,
this time concentrating on noncoercion.
Lee v. Weisman is pending as I write, but the noncoercion issue should
remain after the case is decided. There is no reason for the Court to decide the
case on so broad and ill-fitting a ground. And at the oral argument, the Justices
expressed skepticism or even hostility toward a pure coercion theory. 9
Lee involves the constitutionality of invocations and benedictions at high
school graduation ceremonies and middle school promotion ceremonies in
Providence, Rhode Island. The case was litigated in the lower courts as a
simple dispute about the application of settled precedents to stipulated facts.,"
Plaintiff argued that it was controlled by the school prayer cases," because the
2
prayers were school-sponsored, at a school function, with children present.
The Providence School Committee argued that the case was controlled by a
decision upholding prayers to open sessions of the legislature, because the
relevant category was prayer at civic ceremonies. 4 In the School Committee's
view, the fact that this was a school ceremony was incidental.
The district court and court of appeals held the prayer unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court may affirm in a straightforward application of the school
prayer cases. Or it may reverse, holding that one minute of prayer a year is de
minimis. There is no need to render a sweeping decision on the noncoercion
theory. There is good reason not to do so, because the noncoercion theory
should not affect the result in Lee itself. Children desiring to attend their
graduation are coerced to participate in prayer.

6. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Subtantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. Rnv. 993 (1990).

7. Douglas Laycock, "tonpreferendal'Aid

to Religion: A False Claim About OriginalIntent,

27 WM. & MARY L. Rsv. 875 (1986).
8. Id. at 915-16, 921-22.
9. Linda Greenhouse, JusticesAppear Wary in Argument Over Prayerat School Graduations,
N.Y. 'nMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A14.
10. Weismn v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), affid, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 1I I S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
11. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
12. Appellee's Brief, Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1151), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
13. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
14. Brief for Appellant's (sic), Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cer. granted,
IIl S. Ct. 1305 (1991) (No. 90-1151).
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Even so, new counsel in the Supreme Court urged a decision based on the
noncoercion theory. The School Committee argued that "government coercion
of religious conformity is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause
violation."' 5 The Bush Administration agreed, in an amicus brief filed on
behalf of the United States. 6 As argued, Lee presents the Court with a
sweeping choice between two theories of the Religion Clauses - between
neutrality and noncoercion. This article examines that choice.
I. NEUTRALrrY, NONPREFERENTIALISM, AND NONCOERCION
Nonpreferentialism and noncoercion have common political origins, and
Justice Rehnquist has endorsed them both.'" Each theory originates with the
political desire for government support of religion, and each relies on the
historical observation that government in the founding era did support religion
in a variety of ways. Each theory is an attempt to state a principle that will
distinguish permissible and impermissible forms of government support for
religion. But neither theory produces acceptable results for a pluralistic society,
and neither theory captures the practices of the Founders.
It is important to clearly distinguish the two theories. They are not the
same, and they have very different implications. Under nonpreferentialism,
government must be neutral among religions, but it need not be neutral as
between religion and disbelief. The essence of nonpreferentialism is the claim
that government should be free to encourage or subsidize religious belief and
practice so long as it encourages or subsidizes all religions equally.
Nonpreferentialists do not urge the point, but their theory would permit
government to require all persons to attend some church, so long as it let each
individual choose which church to attend.
Under noncoercion theory, the Religion Clauses are not violated unless
government coerces an individual to religious practice or belief. Neither
neutrality nor nonpreferentialism is part of the noncoercion standard;
government need not be neutral between religion and nonreligion, and it need
not be neutral among competing religions. Government may ndorse generic
theism, generic Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Seventh-Day Adventism, or
the Twelfth Street Pentecostal Holiness Church. Congress could charter The
Church of the United States, so long as it did not coerce anyone to join.

15. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 14.
16. Brief for U.S., supra note 2.
17. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(nonpreferentialism); with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 661 (1989)
(Kennedy, J.,dissenting, joined by Rehnquist and others) (noncoercion).
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Under noncoercion theory, government at all levels could take sides in
debates about the nature of Christ, salvation by works or by faith, scriptural
inerrancy, the authority of the Book of Mormon, or any other religious matter.
The President, the Congress, or the Providence School Committee could adopt
and promulgate creeds.
Noncoercionists believe that "government may
participate as a speaker in moral debates, including religious ones." 8
In theory we might combine the two alternatives to neutrality. That is, we
might permit government to aid religion only in ways that are both noncoercive
and nonpreferential, if anyone can think of such a way. But so far as I am
aware, no one has proposed that, and neither theory leaves room for that.
Thus, nonpreferentialists endorse tax support for church-affiliated schools,
on the ground that any church could start schools and such aid would be
nonpreferential. I think it is common ground that taxation is coercive, 9 so
nonpreferentialists would permit coercion. I doubt that many nonpreferentialists
would really permit government to coerce nonbelievers to pick some church and
attend it. But to avoid that result, they would have to supplement their theory
of the Establishment Clause, or they would have to resort to the Free Exercise
Clause.
It is equally clear that noncoercionists would not require nonpreferentialism.
One of the more visible issues that noncoercionists seek to resolve is the
government-sponsored creche, or nativity scene. The creche symbolizes the
alleged miracle of Christ's Incarnation, a claim that is central to Christianity,
heretical or blasphemous to Judaism and Islam, and largely irrelevant to the
world's other great religions. If noncoercionists mean to permit government
creches, they plainly mean to permit government to endorse particular religions.
One can imagine a practice of noncoercive, nonpreferential religious displays,
in which a government would give equal prominence to displays symbolizing
central events of all religions. But no government has such a practice, and no
defenders of government sponsored religious observances have proposed that
government must observe all religions or none."
Certainly the Bush Administration's argument in Lee did not propose any
combination of noncoercion and nonpreferentialism. The Administration's
argument did not at all depend on the brevity or content of the prayers in that

18. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
19. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 938.
20. But cf. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1099 (1st Cir. 1990) (Campbell, J., dissenting)
(proposing that Providence rotate the graduation prayer among all faiths and philosophies), cert.
granted, IIl S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
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case. The claim that no one was coerced would be equally true or filse if the
Providence School Committee awarded diplomas at a Solemn High Mass, or at
a full length worship service of any other faith.
The most obvious observation about the proposed noncoercion standard is
that it leaves no independent meaning to the Establishment Clause. Even after
Employment Division v. Smith,2 the government would violate the Free
Exercise Clause if it coerced persons to attend or participate in religious
observances against their will. The noncoercion test is also inconsistent with
precedent and With sound policy toward religion, and its claimed basis in
original intent is dubious at best. I begin with history.
II. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

A. Endorsement in the Time of the Founders
Neither nonpreferentialism nor noncoercion explains the practices of the
Founders. As I have argued elsewhere, government supported religion in the
Founders' time in those contexts in which no significant group of Protestants
complained.'
But when a Protestant complaint focused the founding
generation's attention on a practice, they rejected both nonpreferentialism and
noncoercion.
The classic religious establishments known to the Founders consisted of
several elements in varying combinations. In the worst cases, government had
endorsed an official religion, interfered with that religion's self-governance,
suppressed all other religions, and required everyone to adhere to the official
religion, support it with taxes, and participate in its worship. This extreme case
roughly describes most sixteenth-century European establishments and
seventeenth-century Massachusetts. 23
One by one these elements were relaxed or eliminated. Dissenters were
first exempted from attending the established worship services,H then allowed
to practice their own faith, 25 then exempted from paying taxes to support the
established church.' Eventually defenders of establishment proposed to make

21. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
22. Laycock, supra note 7, at 917-19.
23.

See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMEICA TO THE

PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-28 (1986) [hereinafter CURRY).
24. See, e.g., id. at 25.
25. See, e.g., id. at 25-27.
26. Id. at 89-90.
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tax support available to minority religions as well as to the preferred religion, 2
and then government relaxed its control over the official religion.3 The
strategy of defenders of establishment in the United States was to make the
establishment less coercive and less preferential. But the one element that they
could never give up short of total surrender was state endorsement. The only
universal element of every establishment was government endorsement of one
or more religions.
What happened when a state eliminated all the coercive elements of the
establishment and was left with a bare endorsement of a preferred religion?
Would that alone be considered an establishment in the Founders' generation?
There is not as much evidence on this issue as on the issue of
nonpreferentialism. But the preponderance of evidence is that opponents of
establishment were unwilling to accept even a bare endorsement of the
established churches.
The point is most clearly illustrated by the experience of Virginia and South
Carolina between 1776 and 1790. 29 Before independence, the Church of
England was the established church in these states. Each of these states initially
responded to independence by attempting to eliminate coercion and preference
while preserving establishment.
Each state created an establishment by
endorsement: it designated an established religion while eliminating all tax
support and all coercion to believe or to attend services. These reforms proved
insufficient to satisfy the American demand for disestablishment, and the
endorsements were subsequently repealed. It is possible to point to arguable
remnants of coercion in these schemes; preferred churches were permitted to
incorporate, and that may have had some advantages over operating as a trust
or an association. But the principal surviving element of these establishments
was endorsement of a preferred religion, and those endorsements were
unacceptable to opponents of establishment. Endorsement of a religion was an
establishment in the political understanding of the Founders' generation, at least
when their suspicions were aroused and their attention focused on the issue.
The path to disestablishment in Virginia began in 1776, when the legislature
exempted dissenters from the tax to support the Anglican Church. A tax on
Anglicans remained on the books, but the legislature suspended collection. The

27. Id. at 136-48, 153-54, 164; infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
29. For histories of these events, see THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REvOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977) [hereinafter BUCKLEY]; CURRY, supra note 23; HAMILTON
ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA (1910) [hereinafter ECKENRODE];
ANSON PHELPS STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 366-97, 432-34 (1950)
[hereinafter STOKES].
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legislature suspended this tax annually until 1779, when the tax was permanently
repealed.3
"[N]o taxes for religious purposes were ever paid in Virginia after
January 1, 1777."3'
The legislature in 1776 also repealed English laws restricting freedom of
worship. Some provisions for licensing clergy remained in effect but were not
enforced.2 As the leading historian of disestablishment in Virginia summarizes
the situation, "Religion in Virginia had become voluntary, and a man could
believe what he wished and contribute as much or as little as he thought fit to
whichever church or minister pleased him." 33
But it was equally clear that the legislature "had not disestablished the
Church of England."' The American branch of the Church of England, soon
to be known as the Protestant Episcopal Church, was still the official church in
Virginia. This designation had no coercive effect on dissenters; no one was
required to attend or support the Episcopal Church. The principal effect of the
establishment was simply an endorsement.
The Episcopal clergy retained one vestige of coercive power: only they
could perform legally recognized marriage ceremonies.
The other
denominations condemned this monopoly, but no one then or now would contend
that the coercive effect of this monopoly was the only vestige of establishment.
The legislature repealed this monopoly in 1780,'5 and residual licensing rules
were eliminated in 1783 and 1784.6
The Episcopal Church found that its establishment carried the disadvantage
of legislative supervision. The church sought to escape this superyision through
an act incorporating the church and empowering it to govern itself. Such an act
was passed in 1784, repealing all prior laws regulating the relationship between
the state and the established church. 7 This made the established church
independent of the state, but it did not satisfy the opponents of establishment.
The opponents insisted that the law incorporating the Episcopal Church still
gave the church special recognition and a preferred status. A Presbyterian
resolution condemned the act as giving the Episcopal Church "Peculiar

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

CuRRY, supra note 23, at 135-36.
ECKENRODE, supra note 29, at 53.
BuCKLEY, supra note 29, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37.
ECKENRODE, supra note 29, at 67-69.
Id. at 80, 100; BUCKLEY, supra note 29, at 111-12; 1 STOKEs, supra note 29, at 383-84.
BuCKLEY, supra note 29, at 106; 1 STOKES, supra note 29, at 384-87.
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distinctions and the Honour of an important name," and making it "the Church
of the State."38 A Baptist committee denounced it as "inconsistent with
American Freedom."39
Other petitions said the legislature had given
Episcopalians "the particular sanction of and Direction of your Honourable
House. "'
These objections go to endorsement and nothing more. It is hard to identify
any residual coercive effect of the Episcopal incorporation act; its effect was to
give the Episcopal Church special recognition not given to other churches. If
other churches desired to incorporate, Episcopal incorporation was preferential.
But it was not coercive, because the state did not tell other churches that they
could incorporate if they complied with certain conditions. If there were any
residual coercive effect, it fell on Episcopalians; perhaps their self-government
was in some way affected by the terms of the incorporation act. But they were
not complaining; the act had been designed to solve that problem.
Thus, the structure of the act supports the point of the quoted objections:
the objection was that other faiths perceived an endorsement. Note too that the
state's endorsement was implicit rather than explicit; the opponents' objection
was not limited to open and formal declarations of establishment.
Finally, in 1787, the legislature repealed the Episcopal incorporation act,
repealed all laws that prevented any religious society from regulating its own
discipline, confirmed all churches in their existing property, and authorized all
churches to appoint trustees to manage their property. 4 ' This act finally
repealed the last vestige of state endorsement of the Episcopal Church in
Virginia.
The one remaining issue in Virginia was the disposition of church property
acquired with public funds before 1777. That was finally resolved in 1802, with
the Episcopal Church retaining its churches but giving up its glebes, or land for
the support of clergy.' Continuing resentment of the glebes certainly helped
motivate the continued attention to the vestiges of establishment in Virginia. But
with their attention focused on the issue, the founding generation in Virginia was
not content to eliminate coercion, tax support, and the glebes. They also
insisted on eliminating symbolic endorsements of a particular faith.
An even broader attempt at noncoercive establishment appeared in Article

38. BUcKLEY, supra note 29, at 165.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 140.
ECKENRODE, supra note 29, at 121, 122.
BUcKLEY, supra note 29, at 170; 1 STOKES, supra note 29, at 394.
BUcKLEY, supra note 29, at 171-72.
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38 of the South Carolina Constitution of 1778.' 3 The first sentence guaranteed
religious toleration to all monotheists who believed in public worship and a
future state of rewards and punishments; this would have included substantially
the whole population. The second sentence provided that "The Christian
Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be,
the established religion of this State." The third sentence from the end forbad
any tax for the support of churches.
The one coercive element was that only established churches could obtain
a corporate charter. Other churches apparently were organized as trusts or
unincorporated associations; there was a synagogue in Charleston. 4" Churches
desiring to incorporate were required to subscribe to five Protestant tenets set
out in Article 38, their ministers were required to swear an oath set out in
Article 38, and the churches were required to select their ministers by
majoritarian processes. Unlike the Virginia situation, these provisions may have
had some tendency to coerce churches toward the prescribed tenets. But it
would be myopic to say that incorporation rather than endorsement was the
essence of this establishment. If non-established churches had been allowed to
incorporate, and if free exercise had been extended beyond monotheists to
include absolutely everybody, but the rest of Article 38 had been retained,
Protestantism would still have been the established religion of South Carolina.
The establishment inhered in the official endorsement of Protestantism. This
establishment by endorsement was abolished by Article 8 of the Constitution of
1790.4'
The bare endorsements of South Carolina's Constitution and Virginia's
Episcopal incorporation act were the extreme instances of the strategy of making
establishments more inclusive, less preferential, and less coercive. Other
proposals pursued the same strategy less aggressively and with correspondingly
less success.

43. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVII1, in FRANCIs N. THORPE, 6 THE FEDERALAND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,

AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3255-57 (1906).

The provision is discussed and reprinted in 1 STOKES, supra note 29, at 432-34. It is also discussed
in CURRY, supra note 23, at 149-5 1.
44. CURRY, supra note 23, at 151.
45. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 43, at 3264. The provision is
discussed and reprinted in 1 STOKES, supra note 29, at 434. It is also described in CURRY, supra

note 23, at 151. Other provisions of the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 restricted voting rights
to monotheists. Eleven of the thirteen states had religious qualifications for voting, CURRY, supra
note 22, at 162-63, 221, including states that otherwise guaranteed free exercise and
disestablishment. The issues were viewed as separate, and repeal of religious voting qualification
did not require repeal of the endorsement of Protestantism in Article 38.
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The point is illustrated by unsuccessful proposals for general assessments
to support the clergy in Virginia and Maryland. In each state, the supporters of
establishment proposed a tax for the support of clergy, in which each taxpayer
could designate the clergyman to receive his tax.'
It allowed taxpayers to
refuse to designate any clergyman, in which case their tax would be paid to
support local schools.' 7
The element of choice in the taxpayers was said to make the establishment
nonpreferential and noncoercive. The law did not require anyone to support any
religion other than his own. Even more dramatic, the option to support schools
meant that the law did not require anyone to support religion at all. Baptists
would not be required to violate conscience by supporting their own clergy
through the instruments of government.'
Supporters of the Virginia bill
invoked the slogan "Equal Right and Equal Liberty", and argued that
"assessment imposed not 'the smallest coercion' to contribute to the support of
religion. "'9
In fact the bill would have been coercive. Citizens desiring to support an
unpopular religion, or desiring to support no religion at all, would have had to
declare their unusual preference on the public record. Surely in many Virginia
communities there was considerable social pressure to support the dominant
religious leader, and the state-imposed occasion for publicly recording one's
dissent would have aggravated that pressure. But school children experience
intense social pressure to attend their graduation and promotion ceremonies and
to conform their posture and behavior to that of all the others joining in the
prayers that are offered. The position of the School Committee, and the Bush
Administration5' in Lee v.Weisman is that this sort of social pressure does not
count, even when government sponsors both the religious observance and the
civic event that give rise to the social pressure. Under the noncoercion rule
proposed to the Supreme Court, social pressure to designate one's tax in
acceptable ways would not have made the Virginia general assessment coercive.
There remained one irreducible element of coercion in the Virginia bill.
Those who paid their religion tax to a school instead of to a minister would
eventually wind up paying more than their share of the expense of schools. This

46. The Virginia bill is reprinted in the Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947).
47. Id. at 74. The bill's reference to "seminaries of learning" meant secular schools. See
BUCKLEY, supra note 29, at 108-09, 133; Laycock, supra note 7, at 897 n.10.
48. For the Baptist objection, see CURRY, supra note 23, at 89.
49. Id. at 145, quoting petitions to the legislature in 1784 and 1785 (emphasis added).
50. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 35-44.
51. Brief for U.S., supra note 2, at 24-28.
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would presumably be coercive even under the Bush Administration's definition.
The sponsors of the Virginia bill had attempted to eliminate all coercion, but
they had not quite succeeded.
The Maryland bill came closer. Each taxpayer could pay his tax to the
minister of his choice, or to a fund for the poor.52 In addition, any taxpayer
who declared "that he does not believe in the Christian religion. . . shall not
be liable to pay any tax for himself in virtue of this act."5 3 So no one would
be forced to support a church, and non-Christians would not be forced to
support anything. Again there would be a state-created occasion for expressing
one's religious dissent and exposing oneself to the social coercion of the
community, but again, that same problem faces students at graduation, and the
Bush Administration says that is not coercion. But the Maryland bill would
have coerced Christians either to support their own ministers through taxation
(violating the conscience of Baptists) or to file false declarations of nonbelief;
I hope the Bush Administration would recognize that as coercive. So the
Maryland bill too fell short of being completely noncoercive.
Both the Maryland and Virginia assessment bills were the subject of great
public debate, and each was soundly defeated. The Virginia bill was the
occasion for Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, and for many similar memorials by Presbyterians, Baptists, and
State assistance to churches was rejected as an
other religious dissenters.'
establishment, even with the right to designate the recipient of the tax, to pay
the tax to secular uses instead of religious ones, and in Maryland, to escape the
tax altogether by declaring nonbelief.
Each of these bills retained elements of coercion, despite the sponsors' best
efforts to eliminate them. But it would be a mistake to focus only on coercion.
Dramatically reducing the coercive elements had not satisfied the opponents of
establishment, and no one at the time appears to have thought that further steps
to eliminate the remnants of coercion would have made any difference. No one
suggested that the state enact an assessment with an unconditional exemption,
in which the state would calculate a fair share contribution, serve as keeper of
records and agent for collection and distribution, and collect only from those
unconditionally willing to pay. Reducing or eliminating coercion did not affect
The essence of
the essence of what made these bills establishments.
establishment, then as now, was state support for religion.
These debates in the states are directly relevant to the original meaning of

52. CURRY, supra note 23, at 155.
53. CURRY supra note 23, at 155.
54. See BUCKLEY, supra note 29, at 113-43; ECKENRODE, supra note 29, at 103-11.
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the federal Establishment Clause. In sweeping terms, the Constitution prohibits
any law respecting an "establishment."
"Establishment" is not defined.
Unavoidably, the word would have been understood in light of the recent
debates over disestablishment in the states. These debates are the principal
evidence of "how the words used in the Constitution would have been
understood at the time."' As Justice Rutledge observed, "the Congressional
debates on consideration of the Amendment reveal only sparse discussion,
reflecting the fact that the essential issues had been settled."' The Court's
long standing rule that government may not aid or endorse religion is soundly
based in the Founding generation's principle that government may not aid or
support religion, even by bare endorsements in toothless laws.
B. A Note on Interpretive Method
A second thread to the argument for government-sponsored prayer is that
government prayer must be constitutional because the Founders did it."7 The
premise of this argument is that anything the Founders did is constitutional. In
fact Justice Kennedy has gone further, claiming that the Constitution permits
anything the Founders did and "any other practices with no greater potential for
an establishment of religion."'
The Supreme Court has squarely rejected this argument, and properly
so."' The argument proves far too much. Equally important, it ignores the

political origin of constitutional rights.
Constitutional rights are designed to prevent the recurrence of historic

abuses. Eliminating such abuses often requires major political battles. The
People create constitutional rights when the winners of one of these political
battles believe the issue to be so important, and the danger of regression so
great, that the issue must be put beyond reach of the usual political processes.
Because constitutional rights emerge from major controversies, we should not
expect to find a consensus that unites both supporters and opponents of a
constitutional provision, or even a fully consistent view of all related issues
among the supporters. The winners muster a super-majority for a broad
statement of principle, but they do not achieve unanimity on the principle or
even consensus on the details of its application. Every constitutional amendment
has bitter opponents, and in a system of federalism and separated powers, those
opponents may control whole states or branches of government. The attitudes

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMEICA 144 (1990) [hereinafter BOR].
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 42 (1947) (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 604-05.
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that gave rise to the losing side of the controversy do not instantly disappear,
and neither do the abusive practices that made the amendment necessary.
. It ignores political reality to remove from the scope of constitutional rights
any practices that survived ratification.'
By that principle, the Alien and
Sedition Acts are an authoritative interpretation of the Free Speech and Press
Clauses, de jure segregation of schools in the District of Columbia is an
authoritative interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, and the many devices
that led to near total disenfranchisement of black voters for most of a century
are an authoritative interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Moreover, these
abuses would become the standard for further interpretation: government could
engage in any other practice no more restrictive of constitutional rights than the
Alien and Sedition Acts, school segregation, and disenfranchisement of black
voters. Reliance on post-ratification practice leads to such absurd consequences
because it proceeds backwards. It lets the behavior of government officials
control the meaning of the Constitution, when the whole point is for the
Constitution to control the behavior of government officials.
The relevant original understanding is not determined by every specific act
of the Founders. The nation's "heritage of official discrimination against nonChristians has no place in the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause." 6 ,
Rather, as Robert Bork has said, the original understanding of a constitutional
clause consists not of a conclusion but of a major premise. The "major premise
is a principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile
legislation or executive action. "I
Another leading originalist has also explained that original intent depends
on identifiable principles and not on every unexamined practice of the Founders:
Unless we can articulate some principle that explains why legislative
chaplains might not violate the Establishment Clause, and demonstrate
that principle continues to be applicable today, we cannot uphold a
practice that so clearly violates fundamental principles we recognize
under the Clause. ...
The insistence on a principle, and not just
historical fact, follows from the function of interpretation as enforcing
the Constitution as law. If the Constitution is law, it must embody
principles so that we can ensure that like cases are treated alike, and
that those governed by the Constitution can understand what is

60. See Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and zhe Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics

& PUB. POL'Y 683, 688-91 (1990).
61. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 604-05.
62. BORK, supra note 55, at 162-63.
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required of them.'
The basic principle of a constitutional clause is best identified from the
controversies that gave rise to it. These controversies were consciously
examined under political pressure that made the debate real and not just
academic. These controversies identify the core target of the constitutional
right. Interpreters can then search for a coherent principle, consistent with the
constitutional text and as broad as the text, that centers on the core problem the
text was intended to resolve.' 4
The religion clauses had two great defining controversies. One was the
long Protestant-Catholic conflict in the wake of the Reformation. The other was
the battle over disestablishment in the states. These are the contexts in which
the Founders thought about the meaning of establishment, and we should look
to these controversies to learn what they meant by establishment. I have already
discussed the battle over disestablishment in the states. It is also revealing to
examine the American continuation of Protestant-Catholic battles in the
nineteenth centuries.
C. The ProtestantBible Controversy
Government prayer and religious proclamations, and the role of religion in
public education, were not real controversies in the Founders' time. There were
multiple reasons for this lack of controversy, but the most important was simply
that the nation was overwhelmingly Protestant, and no significant group of
Protestants was victimized by these practices. If a religious practice was not
controversial among Protestants, it was not sufficiently controversial to attract
political attention.
Theological and liturgical differences among Protestants were large, but for
a variety of reasons, these differences appear to have been bridgeable in the
rudimentary schools of the time.' Most schools were small, and many served
a relatively homogenous local population. Some were run by local governments,
some by associations of neighbors, some by entrepreneurial teachers, some by
churches. Some of these schools defied characterization as public or private.
In some urban areas, parents had many choices.
The historian Carl Kaestle describes the movement for a more organized

63. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 359, 362-63
(1988) (emphasis in original).
64. See Laycock, supra note 60, at 690.
65. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 1780-1860at 13-61 (1983) [hereinafter KAESTLE].
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system of state-supported schools as growing out of a "Native Protestant
ideology" that was comprehensive in its scope, including religious, political, and
This ideology naturally incorporated religious
social reform principles.'
instruction into the new common schools. The common school movement
attempted to bridge the religious gaps among Americans with an unmistakably
Protestant solution: by confining instruction to the most basic concepts of
The
Christianity, and by reading the Bible "without note or comment."
Protestant leaders of the common school movement assumed that no one could
object to reading the Bible, and by forbidding teachers to explain the passages
read, they thought they had avoided sectarian disagreements about interpretation.
That solution was not entirely satisfactory even among Protestants.
Conservative and evangelical Protestants accused Unitarians like Horace Mann
of secularizing the public schools; stripped-down, least-common-denominator
religion was not acceptable to them.' One spokesman for the critics charged
Horace Mann's Massachusetts schools of teaching "nothing more than Deism,
But Protestants largely abandoned their disagreements to
bald and blank."'
unite against the wave of Catholic immigration in the mid-nineteenth century.6
Catholics fundamentally challenged what seemed to them Protestant
religious instruction in the public schools.' For one thing, Catholics used the
Douay translation of the Bible, and objected to reading the King James
translation, which they called "the Protestant Bible."
More important, Catholics condemned the "solution" of reading the Bible
without note or comment as a fundamentally Protestant practice. 7' Protestants
taught the primary authority of scripture and the accessibility of scripture to
every human. Catholics taught that the scripture must be understood in light of
centuries of accumulated church teaching. For Catholic children to read the
Bible without note or comment was to risk misunderstanding. Protestant
practices were being forced on Catholic children.
The controversy over the Protestant Bible in public schools produced mob
violence and church burnings in Eastern cities.' The resulting controversies

66. Id. at 75-103.
67. CHARLES GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 131-32, 179-96 (1988) [hereinafter
GLENN]; see also KAESTLE, supra note 65, at 98-99.
68. Matthew Hale Smith, quoted in GLENN, supra note 67, at 189.
69. GLENN, supra note 67, at 179; KA.ESTLB, supra note 65, at 98.
70. GLENN, supra note 67, at 196-204; DIANE RAvRITcH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 3-76
(1974) [hereinafter RAvITCH].

71. GLENN, supra note 67, at 199; RAVITCH, supra note 70, at 45.
72. KAESTLE, supra note 65, at 170; RAVITCH, supra note 70, at 36, 66, 75; 1 SToKES, supra
note 29, at 830-31.
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were major political issues for decades. The anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant Know
Nothing Party swept elections in eight states in the 1850s.'
Among other
things, these issues gave rise to the proposed Blaine amendment to the
Constitution, which would have codified the Protestant position by permitting
Bible reading but forbidding "sectarian" instruction in any publicly-funded
school. This amendment was defeated by Democrats in the Senate.71 In
Senator Blaine's subsequent campaign for the Presidency, these issues gave rise
to one of the most famous gaffes in American politics, the jibe that Democrats
were "the party of Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion."75
Thus, in the wake of Catholic immigration, religion in the public schools
produced exactly the sort of violent religious confrontation the Founders had
sought to avoid. Religion in schools initially had been a nonproblem that raised
no concern. Under changed social conditions, religion in schools became a
serious violation of the disestablishment principle, which inflicted precisely
"those consequences which the Framers deeply feared." 76 The principle of
disestablishment did not change, but "the nation was forced to confront a
previously ignored application of the principle. Just as government could not
endorse religion in statutes or state constitutions, neither could it endorse
religion in public schools.
The first cases forbidding religious observances in public schools date from
the latter part of this period.' On the other hand, some schools whipped or
expelled Catholic children who refused to participate in Protestant observances,
and some courts upheld such actions.'
Neither side drew the line between
coercion and noncoercion. Those who understood the grievance of religious
minorities abandoned the offending practice; those who saw no grievance saw
no reason not to coerce compliance.
The dispute over the Protestant Bible revealed the impossibility of
conducting "neutral" religious observances even among diverse groups of
Christians. Protestant education leaders did not set out to victimize Catholics;
they genuinely thought that reading the Bible without note or comment was fair
to all and harmful to none. What seemed harmless from their perspective was

73. 1 STOKES, supra note 29, at 836-37.
74. 2 STOKES, supra note 29, at 68-69.
75. HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-1968 at 1606 (Arthur Schlesinger

ed., 1971).
76. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890) (mandamus against Bible
reading); Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872) (upholding and defending school board's
decision to eliminate Bible reading and hymns).
78. Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Boston Police Ct. 1859); Kaestle, supra
note 65, at 171; 1 Stokes, supra note 29, at 829.
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not harmless when applied across the full range of American pluralism.
Today, the range of religious pluralism in America is vastly greater.
Immigration has brought Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Taoists,
animists, and many others into the country. Significant numbers of atheists and
agnostics have been with us since the late nineteenth century; they were little
more than a theoretical possibility to the Founders. 9 The possibility of
"neutral" religious observance remains a fiction.
III. THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Providence School Committee and the Bush Administration
acknowledge that their new rule would require modification of the familiar test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman ' The Lemon test has been the subject of widespread
academic criticism,"' and I have been one of the critics.'
But the Bush
Administration's attack is not aimed at the unworkable or misguided parts of the
Lemon test. The Administration rejects the sensible core of the Lemon test, and
the whole line of pre-Lemon cases requiring government neutrality toward
religion.
The neutrality requirement did not originate in Lemon. The familiar threepart Lemon test is simply a convenient formulation of "the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years."'
The third prong, excessive
entanglement, came from Walz v. Tax Commission." The first two prongs -the proposition that government conduct should not have the primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion -- came verbatim from one of the school
prayer cases, Abington School District v. Schempp."5 It is these two prongs,
the Schempp-Lemon test, that drew the Bush Administration's principal attack.
The Bush Administration says simply that "The problem is Lemon."" But

79. See JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELUEF IN
AMERICA (1985).
80. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Phillip Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817, 825-31 (1984); Philip Kurland, The Irrelevanceof the Constitution:
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VI.L. L. REv. 3, 17-20
(1978).
82. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 20-28 (1986); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of
Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L. REv. 409, 449-50 (1986).
83. Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
84. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
85. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
86. Brief for U.S., supra note 2, at 20.
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the Administration's "problem" is not Lemon. The Administration's problem
is nearly the whole history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court. The Schempp-Lemon formulation was simply an elaboration of
the fundamental rule that government must be neutral with respect to religion."
The Court stated that rule in global terms in its first modern Establishment
Clause decision, Everson v. Board of Education: the First Amendment
"requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and nonbelievers."s
The Court has never abandoned Everson's neutrality requirement, although
it has sometimes interpreted neutrality in inconsistent ways," and it has twice
rationalized failure to enforce rigorous neutrality against religious observances
that it apparently considered harmless.' The Court has never suggested that
government may comply with the Establishment Clause merely by refraining
from coercion. The Court rejected the proposed noncoercion test at its first
opportunity and at every opportunity since. A majority of a full Court firmly
and explicitly rejected it just two years ago. 9' It is true that many opinions
have mentioned the evil of coercing persons to participate in religious
observances. That is the most egregious case of establishment, and any form
of government support for religion readily slides into coercion by imperceptible
degrees. But none of the Court's opinions have distinguished coercion from
mere government persuasion, condemning one and approving the other. Rather,
the early opinions treated coercion and government persuasion interchangeably,
condemning either as unconstitutional. Because the misimpression seems
widespread that "the problem is Lemon," it is worthwhile reviewing in some
detail the full line of cases on government-sponsored religious observance.
Justice Black wrote for the majority in Everson:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.'
This passage treats force and influence in matters of religion as equally
objectionable. It treats aid to religion as the essence of establishment. And the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1007-11.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
330 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
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Court certainly did not suppose that government could "set up a church" if no
one were coerced to support it.
Justice Rutledge for the four dissenters in Everson was even more explicit
about noncoercive violations of the Establishment Clause. He listed coercive
violations of the Establishment Clause, and he contrasted these with "the serious
surviving threat[s]" of financial aid to religious institutions and "efforts to inject
religious training or exercises and sectarian issues into the public schools. "'
Thus, none of the nine Justices in Everson believed that coercion was an element
of every Establishment Clause violation.
The Court again equated coercion and persuasion in Zorach v. Clausen,'
upholding programs under which schools released students to attend private
religious instruction. The Court said:
..if it were established that any one or more teachers were using
their office to persuade or force students to take the religious
instruction, a wholly different case would be presented."
-

The Court distinguished the released time program in Zorach from the similar
program in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education," on grounds that
it had nothing to do with coercion. The charge of coercion in both cases rested
on the claim that limiting students to study hall or religious instruction coerced
them to choose religious instruction.'
Zorach rejected that claim, finding
neither coercion nor persuasion. Thus, Zorach's explanation of McCollum,
essential to the holding in both cases, is that there was no coercion in
McCollum, but there was an Establishment Clause violation in McCollum necessarily an Establishment Clause violation without coercion. This coercionfree violation was adjudicated in 1948.
The Court distinguished the cases on the ground that religious instruction
was off campus in Zorach, but on campus in McCollum." The key to an
Establishment Clause violation was not coercion, but use of school property.
Justice Brennan believed that the use of school property mattered because it
augmented the persuasive powers of the religious teachers:
To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands substantial

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 44 (Rutledge, J.,dissenting).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 311.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309-10.
Id. at 309.
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respect and merits attention in his own right. But the Constitution
does not permit that prestige and capacity for influence to be
augmented by the investiture of all the symbols of authority at the
command of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular
instruction."
In McGowan v. Maryland," the Court quoted Everson's explanation of
establishment, permitting "neither force nor influence,"'0' and it quoted and
italicized Justice Rutledge's identification of religious exercises in public schools
as a noncoercive threat to disestablishment.102
Thus it was no innovation when the Court squarely rejected a noncoercion
test in the first school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale.t" Nor did the Court
announce a distinction between direct and indirect coercion, as Justice Kennedy
has suggested.104 The Engel Court said that the Establishment Clause went far
beyond even indirect coercion:
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first and most
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion."e
The language elsewhere in the opinion confirms the depth of the Court's
belief that coercion is no essential part of Establishment Clause analysis. It was
unconstitutional for New York "to encourage recitation of the Regents'
prayer,"" to place "its official stamp of approval" on any religion,"0 or
to use its "prestige"to "support or influence the kinds of prayer the American
people can say."108
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to government neutrality toward

99. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 263 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
100. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
101. Id. at 443.
102. Id. at 444 n.18.
103. 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
104. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (emphasis added).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/10

Laycock: "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About th

1991]

"NONCOERCIVE" SUPPORT FOR RELIGION

57

religion in the second school prayer case, Abington School District v.
Schempp. " The Court said that the purpose of the First Amendment was "to
take every form ofpropagationof religion out of the realm of things which could
directly or indirectly be made public business... "110 And the Court said, the
state cannot "perform or aid in performing the religiousfunction.""'
The Court first quoted the entirety of Engel's holding that coercion is not
an element of an Establishment Clause violation," 2 and then for emphasis
paraphrased it more succinctly." 3 And elaborating on "the wholesome
'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak," the Court formulated what
became the first two prongs of the Lemon test: "there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."" 4
Justice Stewart in dissent suggested that coercion should be the key,"S so
the issue was squarely presented. He attracted no vote but his own. But his
sensitive understanding of coercion makes clear that he would find coercion in
Lee v. Weisman. He recognized the dangers of "psychological compulsion to
participate,""' and he thought it would be coercive if students who failed to
attend religious exercises had to forgo "the morning announcements."" 7
Graduation is a far more important event than morning announcements; if
requiring students to miss the morning announcements is coercive, a fortiori
requiring them to miss their graduation is coercive. All nine Justices in
Schempp rejected the Bush Administration's position in Lee v. Weisman.
In 1968, the Court applied the Schempp test in Epperson v. Arkansas,",
and reaffirmed the government's duty to "be neutral in matters of religious
theory, doctrine, and practice."" 9 That same year brought the first of the
long series of cases on financial aid to church-affiliated schools. These cases
are largely irrelevant to the proposed noncoercion test. Financial aid is always

109. 374 U.S. 203, 215, 218, 222, 225-26 (1963).
110. Id. at 216, quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
111. 374 U.S. at 219, quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
112. 374 U.S. at 221.
113. Id.at 223 (". . . a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while
the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.").
114. Id.at 222.
115. Id.at 316-20.
116. Id.at 318.
117. Id.at 320n.8.
118. 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
119. Id.at 103-04.
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coercive, because it requires taxation. Distinctions in financial aid cases turn
on other factors, and the real argument should center on whether the dominant
aspect of the state's conduct is aid to religion or aid to compulsory education in
secular subjects. But the financial aid cases were the occasion for incorporation
of the two-part Schempp test into the three-part Lemon test, and the resulting
Lemon test was quoted and applied in case after case.
The real issue for the proposed noncoercion test is government-sponsored
religious observances. In cases arising in the public schools, the Court has
struck down every such observance it has considered. In Stone v. Graham,"m
Kentucky posted the Ten Commandments on the walls of schoolrooms. If ever
it were plausible to say there is no coercion in a school case, Stone would have
been the case. But the Court summarily invalidated the Kentucky practice,
citing state "auspices" and "official support" for religion as unconstitutional. 2'
Two years later, the Court unanimously invalidated a statute that authorized
students and teachers to volunteer to lead the class in prayer.22 The statute
ineffectually provided that "no student or teacher could be compelled to pray,"
but that did not save the statute or even require full argument.
The following term the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers,' 3 upholding
prayer in the Nebraska legislature. The opinion announced no new standard,
and it did not question the general rule of government neutrality toward religion,
although the result was inconsistent with that rule. Chief Justice Burger wrote
a narrow opinion, relying on the "unique history" of legislative prayer," and
the fact that the person claiming injury was an adult."z Legislative prayer
appeared to be an unprincipled exception to the general rule of neutrality toward
religion. In the same term, another opinion by Chief Justice Burger quoted and
reaffirmed the Schempp-Lemon test,"2 and condemned a "symbolic benefit"
to religion. " Eight Justices joined this opinion.
The following Term suggested that Marsh did not apply to schools, and
perhaps did not apply to anything other than the "unique" case of legislative
prayer. The Court unanimously affirmed invalidation of a statute authorizing
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Id. at 42, quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem., 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792.
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982).
Id. at 125.
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public school teachers to lead willing students in prayer.'2 And all nine
Justices claimed to apply the Schempp-Lemon test to the municipal Christmas
display in Lynch v. Donnelly.'" But the majority created another exception,
finding the display sufficiently secular to justify a finding of secular purpose and
effect.'" This time the majority created an exception without admitting that
it was doing so, and the resulting opinion is an intellectual embarrassment.
Marsh and Lynch showed that the Court would not enforce neutrality with any
rigor, but the Court did not threaten to wholly abandon the principle.
It was in Lynch that Justice O'Connor offered her endorsement test to
clarify the first two prongs of the Lemon test. 3' The Court incorporated
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test into its analysis the following year in
Wallace v. Jaffree. 32 The Court quoted and applied the Schempp-Lemon test,
but it also accepted the endorsement test as an authoritative elaboration:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks
whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.' 33
Wallace was also the occasion for Justice Powell's emphatic defense of the
Lemon test as the settled law of the Supreme Court."
The endorsement test was so readily assimilated to the Schempp-Lemon test
in this context because government-sponsored religious observances rarely
present the ambiguities that the endorsement test was designed to clarify. The
endorsement was offered as a way of explaining that it is not a forbidden benefit
to religion to exempt conscientious objectors or otherwise remove burdens from
religious practice.'" In the context of religious observances, which do not
remove burdens and rarely have plausible secular purposes, it was immediately

128. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (1 lth Cir. 1983), aff'd mem., 466 U.S. 924
(1984).
129. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
130. Id. at 681-82.
131. Id. at 690.
132. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
133. Id. at 56 n.42, quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For similar statements by the Court, see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58 n.45, 59, 61 & n.52.
134. 472 U.S. at 63 & n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Laycock, supra note 82, at 21-22 (purpose
to avoid discrimination against religion is a legitimate purpose, whether considered secular or
religious). I have been persuaded that even the endorsement test does not communicate this
distinction without further elaboration. See McConnell, .supranote 4.
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clear that the endorsement test and the Schempp-Lemon test were compatible.
Two years later, in Edwards v. Aguillard,"6 the Court again applied the
Schempp-Lemon test, 3 ' as clarified by the endorsement test,"3 to strike
down a statute requiring balanced treatment of evolution and "creation science."
The Court noted that Marsh v. Chambers had been the only case in which the
Court failed to apply the Schempp-Lemon test.' 9
Most recently, the Court applied the Schempp-Lemon test, as clarified by
the endorsement test, to prohibit display of a creche in a county courthouse."
The Court did not say that the display was coercive; rather, it said that the
display "has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message." 4 The
Court continued:
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or
"promotion," the essential principal remains the same.
The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from
appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief .
142
The Court explained Lynch v. Donnelly as holding "that government may
celebrate Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses
Christian doctrine."'
Celebrating Christmas without endorsing Christianity
would seem to be an obvious impossibility, but the Allegheny majority took the
Lynch majority at its word. Lynch had implausibly said that Pawtucket's creche
was principally secular; Allegheny more accurately said that Pittsburgh's creche
was not.
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny proposed a fundamentally different
standard: that "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise,"" 4 and that government may not "proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion."'"
The majority emphatically rejected this standard: "Justice Kennedy's
readingof Marsh would gut the core of the Establishment Clause, as this Court

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

482 U.s. 578 (1987).
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 583 n.4.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
Id. at 659.
Couny ofAllegheny, 493 U.S. at 661.
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understands it."'" And, the Court might have added, as the Court has long
and all but unanimously understood it. The Schempp test was adopted eight to
one, and the dissenter, Justice Stewart, understood coercion much more
expansively than the Bush Administration in Lee v. Weisman. The Lemon test
was adopted seven to one - eight to one with Justice Brennan's concurrence.
The dissenter, Justice White, has never voted to uphold school-sponsored
religious observances in a public elementary or secondary school.
The opinions reviewed here, committing the government to neutrality
between religion and nonreligion, and forbidding government persuasion or
influence in religious matters, have been joined by nearly every Justice
appointed since the issues first reached the Supreme Court: by Chief Justices
Vinson, Warren, and Burger, by Justices Black, Reed (in Everson"' although
not in McCollum' 4 ), Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge,
Burton, Clark, Minton, Harlan, Stewart (in Lemon'" although not in
Schempp 5 °), Brennan, White (in Wallace,'5 ' Stone, 152 Epperson,53 and
Schempp, although not in Lemon), Goldberg, Fortas, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. If the new majority abandons the requirement
of government neutrality toward religion, it will not be to correct the excesses
of a few extreme liberals. It will be the work of one political faction rejecting
the nearly unanimous view of all modern justices. As Justice Scalia once said,
when he did not have five votes, "It is not right -- it is not constitutionally
healthy -- that this Court should feel authorized to refashion anew our civil
society's relationship with religion ...."

IV. THE HARM TO RELIGION
It is common to assume that the objection to government-sponsored
religious observances comes only from non-believers who are hostile to religion.
It is easy to see that non-believers might object when government adds a prayer
service to a secular function. A requirement that government be neutral as
between religious belief and disbelief is designed to protect non-believers.
But a ban on government-sponsored religious observance is also necessary
to neutrality among believers, and it is important to understand that. A

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 604.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Lemony. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Jaffrec v. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 45 (1989) (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
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nonpreferentialist instinct informs much of the popular reaction to Lee v.
Weisman: who besides an atheist could object to a short and simple prayer?
That question deserves an answer.
The relevance of nonpreferentialism is political rather than doctrinal. As
noted above, nonpreferentialism is no part of the proposed noncoercion test in
Lee v. Weisman. The Bush Administration's brief would let government be as
sectarian as it likes, so long as it refrains from coercion. But even if
government attempts to sponsor religious observances that are neutral among
believers, it will fail. Government-sponsored religious observances hurt
believers as well as nonbelievers.
Such observances hurt all religions by imposing government's preferred
form of religion on public occasions. It is not possible for government to
sponsor a generic prayer; government inevitably sponsors a particular form of
prayer. Whatever form government chooses, it imposes that form on all
believers who would prefer a different form.
In some communities, government-sponsored prayer unabashedly follows
the liturgy of the locally dominant faith in the community."' "Sensitive"
communities such as Providence attempt to delete from public prayer all indicia
of any particular faith, leaving only the least common denominator of
majoritarian religion. But these stripped-down prayers to an anonymous deity
are as much a particular form of prayer as any other prayer.
The school teachers who plan the ceremony decide what prayers are
acceptable and what not, and what clergy are acceptable and what not. In this
process, the schools establish a religion of mushy ecumenism. The clergy for
these prayers are determined by the limits of acceptability to the mainstream.
In Providence and many other cities, the guidelines for these prayers are
supplied by the National Conference of Christians and Jews. The NCCJ's
guidelines implement its commitment to minimizing religious and ethnic conflict.
The guidelines emphasize "inclusiveness and sensitivity," and they offer a
specific list of "universal, inclusive terms for deity."" 6 Government adoption
of these guidelines establishes an uncodified but generally accepted book of
common prayer. This least-common-denominator strategy is the same strategy
followed by the Protestant school reformers of the nineteenth century, and it
fails for similar reasons. By removing from religious observance all those

155. See, e.g., Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th Cir. 1989)
(frequent references to Christ); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1039 (5th Cir. 1982) (evangelical Protestant school assemblies).
156. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWS, PUBLIC PRAYER IN A PLURALISTIC
SOciETY 2.
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specifics on which different faiths overtly disagree, the school is left with an
abstract impersonal God that nearly all faiths reject. What is left is unacceptable
to many believers who take their own faith seriously.
The problem is as fundamental and intractable as the question of Whom to
pray to. To pray to or in the name of Christ is a blasphemy to most Jews; not
to do so is theologically and liturgically incorrect to most Christians. Is it better
to silently affront the Christian majority by leaving Christ out of prayer, or to
overtly offend the Jewish minority by praying in Christ's name? Given the sad
history of Christian-Jewish relations, leaving Christ out is probably the lesser of
the evils.
The Supreme Court once said that leaving Christ out is
constitutionally required) 7 But leaving Christ out of prayer is not a solution;
it is at the core of the problem.
Whichever choice government makes, it endorses that choice. Governmentsponsored prayer on public occasions lends the weight of government practice
to a preferred form of prayer. By their example, schools that leave Christ out
of prayer endorse that practice as more tolerant, as more enlightened, as
government approved. They lend the authority of government to a desacralized,
watered-down religion that demands little of its adherents and offers few benefits
in return.
The attempt to be inclusive amplifies the message of exclusion to those left
out. Because such prayers are carefully orchestrated not to offend anyone who
counts in the community, the message to those who are offended is that they do
not count -- that they are not important enough to avoid offending. The message
is:
We go out of our way to avoid offending people we care about, but
we don't mind offending you. If you have a problem with this, you
are too marginal to care about. This is our graduation, not yours.
It is not just nonbelievers who may be offended or excluded by prayers like
those in Lee v. Weisman. Such prayers also exclude serious particularistic
believers, those who take their own form of prayer seriously enough that they
do not want to participate in someone else's form of prayer. There are still
millions of Americans who believe that all religions are not equal, that their own
religion is better, or even that their own religion is the one true faith, and that
their faith should not be conglomerated into something that will not offend the
great majority.

157. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
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Those who would not pray at all, those who would pray only in private,
those who would pray only after ritual purification, those who would pray only
to Jesus, or Mary, or some other intermediary, those who would pray in
Hebrew, or Arabic, or some other sacred tongue, are all excluded or offended
by the prayers in Lee v. Weisman. Those who object to the political or
theological content of those prayers are similarly excluded - those whose vision
of God is not the government's vision, those whose concept of God does not
track the National Anthem, whose God is not "the God of the Free and Hope
of the Brave," but perhaps the God of the oppressed and the Hope of the
fearful.' 3
On occasion, religious observances in public schools still produce ugly
confrontations between those who object to least-common-denominator prayer
and those who support it. A detailed account of such an incident appears in
Waker v. West Virginia Board of Education,'" where an eleven-year old
Jewish child was condemned as a Christ killer because he did not appear to pray
during a moment of silence. Most contemporary religious dissenters in public
schools suffer in silence, and we have had no recent repetitions of the mob
violence of the nineteenth century. But reduction of violence is not a reason to
relax constitutional protections. Religious dissenters should not have to provoke
violence to call attention to their constitutional rights.
The political content of the prayer in Lee illustrates another core danger of
established religion. When government sponsors religious observances, it
appropriates religion to its own uses and unites religious and governmental
authority. The message of the invocation in Lee v. Weisman was an essentially
political message -- that American government is good, that freedom is secure,
that courts protect minority rights, that America is the land of the free and the
home of the brave, etcetera.
The invocation's political message is popular but not uncontroversial. The
school can deliver that political message if it chooses. The rabbi can deliver that
message if he chooses. But the school and the rabbi cannot unite the authority

158. The invocation in Lee reads as follows:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diversity is

celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young
men and womengrow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May
these new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which
all its citizens may participate, for its court system where all can seek justice we thank
You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of
America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that
they help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people,
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN.
Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098 n.0 (Campbell, J., dissenting).

159. 610 F. Supp. 1169, 1172-73 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
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and prestige of church and state in support of that message. The school cannot
recruit a rabbi to wrap that political message in religious authority. The school
cannot misappropriate the authority of the church to prop up the authority of the
state.
It has long been a common observation that religion has thrived in America
without an establishment, and declined in Western Europe with an
establishment'60
It is less commonly observed that the established
Congregationalist and Episcopalian churches of colonial America declined in
numbers and influence, while the dissenting Baptists and Presbyterians, who
insisted on rigorous disestablishment, grew and flourished. 6'
These long term religious trends reflect in part the baleful effects of
government sponsorship. Religion does not benefit from public prayer that
"degenerates into a scanty attendance, and a tiresome formality.""
The
Providence School Committee actually quoted this description of congressional
devotions, apparently to show that nonbelievers need not fear being persuaded
to belief." 3 But the Constitution is equally violated if government makes
religion less attractive rather than more so. Government sponsorship of religion
is always clumsy, and usually motivated more by political concerns than
religious ones. In intolerant communities it tends inevitably toward persecution;
in tolerant communities it tends inevitably toward desacralization. One function
of the Establishment Clause is to avoid this dilemma.
V. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S ALTERNATIVE

In his dissent in the Pittsburgh creche case, Justice Kennedy proposed that
the Establishment Clause might be satisfied if government refrained either from
coercion or from proselytizing.'" The Court squarely rejected Kennedy's
proselytizing test," and no one urged it in Lee v. Weisman. But it seems
more likely that if the Court sharply reinterprets the Establishment Clause, it
will move to Kennedy's test, which has already received four votes, instead of
to the Bush Administration's more extreme proposal that would let government
proselytize as long as it does not coerce.

160. See, e.g., 1 ALEXIS DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 308-14 (Phillips Bradley
ed., 1945).
161. See Andrew M. Greeley & Michael Hout, Musical Chairs: Patterns ofDenominational
Change, 72 SocioLooY & SOciAL RESEARCH 75, 81 Table 3 (1988).
162. Madison's 'Detached Memoranda", 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 539 (3d Ser. 1946)
(Elizabeth Fleet ed.).
163. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 32 n.33.
164. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 661 (1989).
165. Id. at 602-13.
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I have only the vaguest idea which endorsements of religion would count
as proselytizing. Apparently, proselytizing is a matter of degree. Some
government endorsements of religion would be permitted, but persistent
endorsements would be forbidden proselytizing,'" and presumably insistent
endorsements or explicit calls to conversion would be forbidden proselytizing.
Much prayer would be proselytizing, which may be why no one urged the
proselytizing test in Lee. Prayers are an important, powerful, and frequent
means of proselytizing. Evangelists lead their audience in prayer; proselytizers
pray privately with individuals. No one would doubt the proselytizing intent of
a pastor at commencement who prayed "that the Holy Spirit pass through this
class, and touch every heart, and lead these graduates to Jesus." There are
endless variations of proselytizing more subtle than this example. Unless courts
and school boards are to parse the content of prayers, the only way to avoid
proselytizing at commencement is to avoid prayer at commencement.
More fundamentally, the proselytizing test violates the Establishment Clause
for most of the same reasons a coercion test would violate the Establishment
Clause. First, the proselytizing test is inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Clause. The bare endorsements of the South Carolina Constitution and the
Virginia Episcopal incorporation act presumably did not amount to proselytizing,
but they were establishments in the understanding of the founding generation.
Second, the proselytizing test is inconsistent with historical applications of
the original principal. Reading the Bible "without note or comment" was an
attempt to avoid proselytizing as well as sectarian division. But as shown
above, this program was the source of bitter religious strife. Religious
observances in the public schools, with or without overt proselytizing, led to the
very evils the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent.
Third, the proselytizing test is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
modem precedents. From the beginning, the Court has properly insisted that
government be neutral toward religion. Government was not to refrain merely
from coercion, or from proselytizing, but from "persuasion," from "influence,"
from any "stamp of approval," from any departure from "neutrality."
Fourth, government-sponsored religious observances inflict the same harms
on religion whether or not government proselytizes. The vagueness of a
proselytizing test may steer some governmental units away from the specific
liturgy of any particular faith, but this will only reinforce the tendency to
desacralization. There is no avoiding the central dilemma: when government

166. Id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (year-round cross on city hall would be proselytizing).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/10

Laycock: "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About th

1991]

"NONCOERCIVE" SUPPORT FOR RELIGION

67

conducts religious rituals, it must conduct them in some concrete form, and
whatever form it chooses is endorsed and tendered to the community as a model.
For all these reasons, the proselytizing test is an inadequate protection for
religious liberty.
VI. THE BUSH ADMiNISTRATION'S CONCEPTION OF COERCION
An essential feature of Lee is a captive audience of young children. It is
not merely that children are in attendance, or that children want to be in
attendance. It is also that the event is planned especially for children, to honor
children on one of the major accomplishments of their young lives. Providence
says to its high school graduates, and to its middle school promotees: if you
wish to be honored on your promotion, you must first be "compelled to listen
to the prayers" of others."'
The children have no realistic choice but to sit through the prayers
attentively and respectfully. They must give every outward appearance of
joining in the prayers. This is not like a passive display, where people can
"turn their backs."10 Nor is it like a legislature, where adults come and go
at will, and can avoid the invocation by the simple expedient of arriving late.
The Providence School Committee seemed to assume there is no coercion
unless children are compelled to believe in the religious premises of the
prayers.' 0 But that is absurd. That standard would permit the state to compel
church attendance, or any other religious behavior. It is impossible to compel
belief; outward manifestations of belief are all that the state can ever hope to
compel. When the state compels children to give respectful attention to prayers,
it has violated even the coercion test.
The prayers in Lee are also especially problematic because of the state's
role in planning and supervising the content of the prayers. School teachers plan
the ceremony. They decide whether to include prayers, how many prayers, and
at what point. They select the clergy to offer the prayers. They give the clergy
"guidelines" to acceptable prayer. They call to make sure the clergy understand
Participating clergy cannot avoid the inference that they are
the guidelines.'
unlikely to be invited again if they depart from the guidelines. Government and
religion are hopelessly entangled in this process. Just as "it is no part of the

167.
168.
169.
170.
States, at

Wallace v. Jaffrec, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Q Cowuy of AUegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 41 (heading 3).
Joint Appendix in Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 in the Supreme Court of the United
12-13.
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business of government to compose official prayers,"""' so it is no part of the
business of government to prescribe official guidelines for prayer.
The teachers' central role in planning and supervising these prayers negates
any claim that the clergyman they select is simply a private speaker. Lee is
wholly unlike Board of Education v. Mergens," where there was no school
sponsorship and a wholly voluntary audience. It is wholly unlike religious
imagery in a commencement address by Martin Luther King, where a prominent
public figure was invited to speak on any topic of his choice. In Lee, carefully
selected clergy are invited solely to pray, at times designated by the school and
in accordance with liturgical guidelines imposed by the school.
Lee is not a free speech case or an equal access case. It is a school prayer
case, plain and simple.
In terms of school sponsorship, government
entanglement, and coercion of children, Lee is indistinguishable from Engel and
Schempp. It differs from those cases only in the frequency of the constitutional
violation. If the Court holds that school prayer is permitted occasionally but not
daily, it will be faced with a long series of cases asking how often is too often,
and which occasions are special enough. If commencement is exempt from the
school prayer cases, what about holidays, student assemblies, athletic events,
pep rallies, and any other day on which an "occasion" can be identified?
School-sponsored and school-supervised prayer is not the only way to take
religious note of graduation. A private baccalaureate service, sponsored by the
local association of churches and synagogues, is the obvious constitutional
alternative. Unsponsored student groups exercising their rights under Mergens
might organize religious observances of the occasion.
Either of these
alternatives would leave religious worship in religious hands, either would avoid
coercion of young children, and either would avoid government sponsorship.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is too often forgotten that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause both protect religious liberty. They both protect religious believers as
well as nonbelievers. In the words of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.):
Together the two Clauses guarantee that the people will have the
fullest possible religious liberty. The state may not interfere with the
private choice of religious faith either by coercion or by persuasion.
It may not interfere with the expression of faith either by inducing

171. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
172. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
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people to abandon the religious faith and practice of their choice, or
by inducing them to adopt the religious faith and practice of the
government's choice.17
The noncoercion standard would abandon the goal of government neutrality
toward and among religions. It would encourage government to denigrate,
embarrass, and discomfit nonbelievers. But it would also leave America's many
religions exposed to the corrupting intrusions of government. Government could
sponsor preferred churches, preferred theologies, preferred liturgies, preferred
forms of worship, and preferred forms of prayer. All this is entailed when
government undertakes to sponsor a "civil religion."
Government by its sheer size, visibility, authority, and pervasiveness could
profoundly affect the future of religion in America. For government to affect
religion in this way is for government to change religion, to distort religion, to
interfere with religion. Government's preferred form of religion is theologically
and liturgically thin. It is politically compliant, and supportive of incumbent
administrations. One function of the Establishment Clause is to protect religion
against such interference. To government's clumsy efforts to assist religion,
several religious amici said "No thanks. Too much of such" assistance "and we
are undone; the Constitution protects us from assistance such as this."74

173. God Alone Is Lord ofthe Conscience: A Policy Statement Adopted by the 200h General
Assembly ofthe Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (1988) at 7, reprinted in 8J.L. & RELIGION 331, 332
(1990).
174. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress, et al., in Support of Respondents
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